"SHIP-DESTROriNG   ENGINES"

bottoms, not one exploded and the fleet went through unscathed.

When the Confederates first began to lay mines the Federals professed to be as indignant as the French had been, but before hostilities were over they too had adopted this method of warfare. Immobile contact mines were also used by Paraguay in 1868 during the war against Brazil, and sank the Brazilian ironclad Rio Janeiro. During the Franco-Prussian War the Germans prevented the French from attacking their principal ports by defending them with contact and electrically-controlled mines.

The mine continued to be regarded as a weapon of defence until the Russo-Turkish War, when in May, 1877, a small party under a Russian lieutenant swam across the Lower Danube towing an electro-controlled mine, which they placed under the bottom of the Turkish monitor Dar-Matoin. When the mine was fired the ship was blown to pieces and not a man on board was saved.

This was an isolated incident, however, and although the Russians are said to have been the first to sweep for mines—by towing weighted hawsers between a pair of tugs— when war broke out with Japan they confined themselves to protecting Port Arthur by an extensive minefield, on which their own armed minelayer, the Yenisei, was sunk.

Five years previously, however, an Italian officer had invented a mine designed to be laid outside enemy ports for purposes of blockade, and demonstrated in naval manoeuvres that fleets could be forced over mined areas. It may be that the imitative minds of the Japanese adopted this idea, for they laid a line of mines outside the Port Arthur field. A decoy squadron then lured the Russian admiral out of the harbour, with the result that the flagship Petropavolosk struck two coupled mines and sank within three minutes. This was the first ship to be destroyed by a minefield laid in anything but defence, and other casualties followed. The Russians retaliated by laying mines in the open sea and

sank two Japanese battleships in a single day. The mine thus became recognized as a weapon of aggression, and the Germans were not slow to mark the lessons of the war. They carried out elaborate experiments, made preparations for manufacture, and drew up plans for widespread minelaying in the event of a naval war.

The British Admiralty was slower to act, not realizing the potency of the mine in the hands of an unscrupulous enemy and relying on the Hague Convention which stipulated that mines might be laid only in the territorial waters of an opponent. It was supposed that naval patrols would be able to deal with any surface minelayers which approached the coast, and no one appears to have suspected that minefields could be laid by submarines. Nevertheless, Admiral Lord Charles Beres-ford foresaw the need of providing shipping with adequate protection against mine-warfare, and after a visit he paid to the East Coast ports in 1907 when Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, he recommended the use of Grimsby trawlers for minesweeping. He argued that in time of war many vessels of the fishing fleet would be inactive and therefore available for war service. Fishermen were more skilled than naval ratings in the handling of wires and trawls, and the employment of trawlers would free the small naval craft for other duties.

The Admiralty hired two trawlers with their fishing crews, and sent them to Portland for minesweeping experiments. These trials were successful, and shortly afterwards the Trawler Section of the Royal Naval Reserve was formed. Arrangements were made for 100 trawlers to be mobilized on the outbreak of war and for the immediate enrolment of 1,000 officers and ratings. The rank of Skipper, R.N.R., appeared in the Navy List for the first time.

There was no lack of volunteers for the new Service. It was to be some years before they were needed, but Lord Charles Beresford's foresight was justified when the time came.